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Media audiences, 
ethnographic practice 
and the notion of a 
cultural field
Adrian Athique
Centre for Critical and Cultural Studies, University of  Queensland
  This article will consider in detail the implications of a 
diffuse social imagination for existing paradigms of ethnographic audience 
research. The notion of a ‘cultural field’ research model will be offered here 
as an alternative structure for locating media communities as sites of social 
practice. This is a theoretical framework that reformulates the conception of 
media audiences as ‘imagined communities’ by replacing a demographically 
constituted ethnographic model with an emphasis on surveying the diverse 
inhabitants of a cultural field constructed around participation in particular 
instances of media practice.
  cultural studies, ethnography, globalization, media audiences
Introduction
The purpose of this article is to raise some of the theoretical and meth-
odological considerations that arose during my recent research into the 
transnational dimensions of Indian film culture. As such, I will not present 
any of the material collected in the course of that study, nor any of its con-
clusions (for this, see Athique, 2005, 2006a, 2006b). Instead, I seek here 
to share some of the understandings and position-takings that informed 
the conceptualization and execution of that research, and which might 
have some useful bearing on thinking about other transnational media 
audiences as communities linked by cultural practices and, more broadly 
still, about media audiences as sites of discourse and as objects for social 
research. Ultimately, I will elaborate upon the notion of a ‘cultural field’ 
as a theoretical framework that reformulates the conception of media 
audiences as ‘imagined communities’ by replacing a demographically con-
stituted ethnographic model with an emphasis on surveying the diverse 
inhabitants of a cultural field constructed, and radically contextualized, 
around participation in particular instances of media practice.
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There were three pressing practical reasons for conceptualizing and 
adopting this approach in my recent research. First of all, at the outset, 
the volunteers who identified themselves as interested in Indian films in 
the study area constituted a genuinely multi-ethnic body. Second, their 
object of mutual interest was demonstrably transnational and cross-media 
in its economic and discursive structures. Third, the media environment 
that the volunteers inhabited (Australia) was itself characterized by 
complex transnational media practices. It became necessary, therefore, 
to revisit the theorization of the media audience because the existing 
paradigms for researching audiences (as citizen-spectators of a national 
media, as demographically constituted minority-subjects in national space 
or as re-territorialized global ethnicities) did not appear to allow for an 
adequate analysis of the imaginative relations constructed around media 
artefacts in the culturally diverse and media-rich societies that much of 
the world’s population now inhabits. By contrast, the notion of a cultural 
field appeared to offer more interesting possibilities for media research in 
this much untidier, but undeniably compelling, version of our world.
The imagination as a social fact
To begin with, the investigation of what might be called the extra-territorial 
life of the Indian movie was inevitably implicated in the wider discussions 
surrounding the contemporary manifestations of the phenomena collectively 
referenced as ‘globalization’. This is a context within which transnational 
cultural relationships are seen as both effective and reflective components 
of a world marked by increasingly mobile forms of understanding and 
agency. It is within this context that Arjun Appadurai has claimed that 
modernity is no longer confined to a centre–periphery model of trans- 
mission, and that in the contemporary imagination modernity has become 
‘decisively at large’ (Appadurai, 1996: 3). Appadurai presents ‘a theory 
of rupture that takes media and migration as its two major, and inter-
connected, diacritics and explores their joint effect on the work of the 
imagination as a constitutive feature of modern subjectivity’ (1996: 3), 
going as far as to suggest that a ‘mobile and unforeseeable relationship 
between mass-mediated events and migratory audiences defines the core 
of the link between globalization and the modern’ (1996: 4). From this 
perspective, Appadurai points to the role played by transnational media 
currents in shaping and sustaining equally transnational audiences by 
addressing ‘deterritorialized’ ethnic subjectivities, which he describes as 
‘diasporic public spheres’ (1996: 22).
There is, of course, an important ‘pre-globalization’ antecedent to 
such an argument. Over 20 years ago, Benedict Anderson ([1983] 1991) 
famously posited the effects of media use upon the imagination as a trans-
formative force in the socialization of a modern community. Anderson 
claimed that participation in the new mass audiences facilitated by the 
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emergence of print media encouraged individuals to imagine themselves 
as part of larger and more abstracted social formations. The ‘work of the 
imagination’, which is so central to Appadurai’s notion of ‘modernity at 
large’, is a good example of how the influence of Anderson’s notion of an 
‘imagined community’ has informed subsequent discussion on the ways in 
which interactions between media practices and social identification serve 
to shape relational subjectivities. The widespread adoption of this model 
of describing audiences by scholars in media studies, and the extension of 
his own observations in later work to encompass ‘the representations of 
popular performance’ (Anderson, 1998: 29), has provided much of the 
conceptual ground for consumers of visual media to be considered as com-
munities. Although Anderson’s explanation can be called technologically 
deterministic, it is much less so if we focus on the communicative content 
of the media rather than simply the existence of its infrastructure. From 
this view, communities arising from media use must be seen as culturally 
constructed collectives. Media technologies themselves may indicate the 
potential, and even the inevitability, of modern community formation, 
but they cannot of themselves explain the nature of such communities. 
Therefore, if the connection that Anderson proposes between media 
sources and communal identity is to be accepted, what then requires a 
great degree of further study is the nature of the imaginings which make 
such relations possible. On that basis, it seems quite perplexing that much 
of the subsequent research on ‘imagined communities’ has focused over-
whelmingly on the latter part of that couplet.
By contrast, what I will seek to do here is to clarify what an emphasis 
on imagination implies in the practical context of social research. I adopt 
the premise that imagination is not simply a device for the narration of 
abstract symbolic relations. The imagination is understood as connecting 
humanity with the material world, providing the terrain for collaboration 
in social behaviours with a seemingly endless potential for transformation. 
It is conceded that imagination cannot be concretely understood either at 
the individual level addressed by psychoanalysis or as the massified social 
force addressed by the grand narratives of political thought. Nonetheless, 
since I am concurring with the claims of both Anderson and Appadurai 
that it is in the imagination that social identity exists, it becomes neces-
sary to investigate the actions and articulations which seek to return the 
imagination to the realm from which it draws its inspiration. The sub-
sequent discussion of the work of the social imagination will therefore 
be focused upon the imprint of what is produced by such ‘actions and 
articulations’ – namely, culture. Culture is seen here as the product of 
imagination, and the sum of cultural production as constructing the order 
of social life. In this sense, culture is ultimately as vast and unknowable 
as the imagination. However, since I have positioned cultural practice as 
manifest imagination, it is logical that its manifestation can at least be 
observed in part.
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Appadurai puts the ‘electronic’ visual media at the heart of contemporary 
global discourse, locating transnational media practices as both catalysts 
and primary evidence of a changing world:
The world we live in today is characterized by a new role for the imagination 
in social life. To grasp this new role, we need to bring together the old idea 
of images, especially mechanically produced images (in the Frankfurt School 
sense); the idea of the imagined community (in Anderson’s sense); and the 
French idea of the imaginary (imaginaire) as a constructed landscape of 
collective aspirations, which is no more and no less real than the collective 
representations of Emile Durkheim, now mediated through the complex prism 
of modern media. The image, the imagined, the imaginary – these are all 
terms that direct us to something critical and new in global cultural processes: 
the imagination as a social practice … The imagination is now central to all 
forms of agency, is itself a social fact, and is the key component of the new 
global order. (Appadurai, 1996: 31)
The ‘complex transnational construction of imaginary landscapes’ and the 
‘imagination as a social practice’ are clearly central to any conceptual-
ization of contemporary media audiences. However, I am less inclined to 
accept Appadurai’s ‘theory of rupture’ itself, where the imagination has 
been largely subject to the imposition of a radical new form by the deter-
ministic power of electronic media. Instead, the transformative power of 
print media (discussed by Anderson) and of electronic media (discussed by 
Appadurai) might be seen as points of exponential increase in the potential 
of dialogic technologies which are nonetheless subject in their creation to 
the aspirations of the imagination. As Marcel Stoetzler and Nira Yuval-
Davies (2002: 325) have stated: ‘The faculty of the imagination not only 
conditions how sensual data are transformed into conscious knowledge 
… the imagination is also fundamental to why, whether and what we 
are ready to experience, perceive and know in the first place.’ If media 
technologies are catalytic forces acting upon the imagination, then they 
are also in themselves outcomes of cultural practices (science, commerce, 
leisure, politics) that are shaped by the imagination. The imagination as 
social practice may not, therefore, be a radically new phenomenon, but a 
persistent discursive mode through which the phantasms of the ‘modern’ 
and ‘traditional’, and the ‘global’ and ‘local’, have appeared historically. 
On that basis, I feel that I must contest Appadurai’s claim that due to the 
advent of the electronic media:
the imagination has broken out of the special expressive space of art, myth, 
and ritual and has now become a part of the quotidian mental work of ordinary 
people in many societies. It has entered the logic of ordinary life from which 
it had largely been successfully sequestered … it is no longer a matter of 
specially endowed (charismatic) individuals, injecting the imagination where 
it does not belong. Ordinary people have begun to deploy their imaginations 
in the practice of their everyday lives. (1996: 5)
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I believe that it remains an equally valid proposition to consider the im-
agination of ordinary people as a powerful historical force. It is absurd to 
suggest that the ‘ordinary’ have ever lacked an imagination or the ability 
to use it. ‘Specially endowed’ leaders might be better seen as successful 
applicants to roles emerging under the influence of various cumulative 
forces of human imagination, rather than prophetic figures, emerging from 
a vacuum, with big ideas. In that sense, the ‘special expressive place of art, 
myth and ritual’ in different temporal and social conditions has always been 
created and defined in the first place by the cultural logic of everyday life. 
It is therefore possible, necessary even, to challenge Appadurai’s analysis 
on the grounds that it demonstrates a certain ahistoricism as well as a lack 
of democratic credentials. However, for my purposes, what gives great 
strength to Appadurai’s reading of the mediated social imagination is not 
his ‘theory of rupture’, but his (paradoxical?) emphasis on ‘everyday cul-
tural practice through which the work of the imagination is transformed’ 
(1996: 9). So whereas much of the recent discussion of media globalization 
has been largely concerned with media hubs, media flows and thus, 
primarily, media production, Appadurai has emphasized instead the role 
of media consumption in the social imagination:
it is wrong to assume that the electronic media are the opium of the masses. 
This view, which is only beginning to be corrected, is based upon the notion 
that the mechanical arts of reproduction largely reprimed ordinary people 
for industrial work. It is far too simple. There is growing evidence that the 
consumption of the mass media throughout the world often provokes resist-
ance, irony, selectivity, and in general, agency … this is not to suggest that 
consumers are free agents, living happily in a world of safe malls, free lunches, 
and quick fixes … Nevertheless, where there is consumption there is pleasure, 
and where there is pleasure there is agency. (1996: 7)
The next step, therefore, towards an imaginative approach to media 
audiences is to shift the discussion of media cultures away from the political 
economies of production and towards the variable conditions of media 
reception in a world structured semantically by transnational politics: a 
world that is, nonetheless, inhabited by human beings enjoying a measure 
of discursive agency.
Media studies, ethnographic practice and the 
‘situated imagination’
One of the major constitutive features of Anderson’s model of the ‘imagined 
community’ was that it emphasized the common over the particular, 
suggesting that each member of an imagined community conceives of 
other unknown members in terms of a ‘deep horizontal comradeship’ or 
‘fraternity’ (Anderson, [1983] 1991: 7). In turn, the social model of media 
studies has tended to assume that each viewer hypothetically positions 
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other viewers as taking part in the same mythic and textual engagement, 
of watching the same film similarly. While this sameness of experience 
might be said to have been disproved consistently by qualitative research 
into ‘active’ audiences, it is a subjective illusion which certainly continues 
to influence how we relate our personal media use to a wider social sphere. 
As a paradigm for media research, however, the use of an ‘imagined com-
munity’ argument in this form tends to rely on the prior establishment of 
a collective entity under terms that are extraneous to media use. I mean 
by this that it is in circumstances where shared media use is in the first 
place coterminous with other parameters of social classification that 
the notion of imagined community most typically forms the basis for 
a large-scale reading of social identification. It is often assumed that 
where a relatively discrete community can be established, in terms of 
nationality, ethnicity, class or otherwise, the media practices of that cat-
egorical group can be analysed in order to make a cultural assessment 
of the collective social imagination of a ‘community’. This can be done 
empirically (through observation), qualitatively (through interviews), 
or psychoanalytically (through textual analysis related to a hypothetical, 
generic member of that group). In the context of my own area of research, 
some useful examples of this approach might be the well-known work of 
Marie Gillespie (1995) in the UK or, in Australia, the studies included in 
Cunningham and Sinclair’s (2000) edited collection Floating Lives, and 
in particular, the contribution of Manas Ray (2000), which has also been 
published elsewhere (Ray, 2003).
The great benefit of an ethnographic study in this form, analysing 
trends in media use among a categorically defined community, is that it 
possesses a certain narrative cohesion, since it dovetails neatly with demo-
graphic understandings of human populations as constituted by a series 
of classifiable types. In considering the drawbacks, however, it is first of 
all worth recognizing that most anthropologists have long conceded that 
there is no such thing as a homogeneous cultural community with fixed 
boundaries. Faye Ginsburg, for example, states that an investigation of the 
‘social relations of media production, circulation, and reception’ requires 
an understanding of how even a single audience subject may be the site of 
plural and complex social identities’ (Ginsburg, 2002: 363). In the anthro-
pology of the contemporary media, researchers need to consider a subject 
employing multiple identities interacting with an object which is itself 
active across multiple social terrains. Therefore, any investigation of media 
reception, and of the construction of social meanings, has to be considered 
as an enquiry that juxtaposes what are essentially moving objects.
Even without facing this challenge to cultural identity as a reliable 
anthropological meter, a media audience is not likely to fit absolutely 
with any identified social group. A ‘blunt’ ethnographic approach towards 
media audiences is likely to ignore such discrepancies. This is particularly 
tempting when there is a demonstrably high incidence of a given media 
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practice among the population in question – few would deny, for example, 
that the audience for Indian movies is comprised of Indians in large part. 
However, there are in fact millions of non-Indians who also watch Indian 
films, and any inclination to look at the use of media in identity construc-
tion by Indians as a nexus of globalized cultural positioning should also 
be tempered by the recognition that it is equally true that there are many 
Indians who do not watch Indian films. If we position the consumption of 
films as constitutive of an act of cultural maintenance or ethnic belonging, 
it would still be absurd to suggest that those who do not patronize Indian 
films are, on that basis, relatively lacking in Indian-ness. To complicate 
matters even further, in a more connected world, viewers are almost 
certainly not fixated upon any single media diet. To presume otherwise 
almost inevitably leads to essentialism of the following kind: all Indians 
are obsessed with Indian movies and this is an essential component, and 
therefore measure, of their identity (and no-one else’s). In such a reading, 
non-Indian fans of Indian movies and Indians who are not movie fans (or 
are fans of other kinds of movies) become marginalized as agents whose 
behaviour is anomalous to the normative conditions set by the research 
paradigm. This is because their ‘social identity’ as inhabitants of a certain 
‘ethnicity’ cannot be correlated directly, and empirically, to their personal 
practices of media consumption – a thornier problem for cultural studies, 
perhaps, than for those individuals themselves.
A more sophisticated, or ‘situated’, ethnographic approach towards 
media audiences takes into account the heterogeneity of the population in 
question and the internal contradictions which are likely to exist within it. 
It also recognizes the external influences that both reinforce and destabilize 
the social identity of the group. In its most convincing form, a situated 
approach seeks to evaluate the whole range of cultural practices present 
within a sampled group; these might be variously constituted as forms 
of production–reproduction, import–export and relation–translation. In 
attempting to do justice to the complexity of social life, a situated study 
cannot plausibly be restricted to, or draw conclusions from, media use 
alone. In this sense, the situated model of media ethnography is much 
closer to the classical anthropological model where an extensive cultural 
enquiry into social relations must be enacted in order to contextualize 
adequately the discussion of any particular detail. Correspondingly, where 
the situated ethnographic method is most useful is in understanding 
the context of media use within a given locality which can be observed 
either in totality or by a reasonably dense sample – thus a household, a 
street, a suburb. In addition, as with more contemporary anthropology, 
studies of this kind must also account for the temporal dimension – the 
recognition that all cultural practices are dynamic and change over time 
without necessarily becoming ‘corrupted’ or less ‘authentic’ behaviours. 
The situated model becomes difficult to apply successfully when dealing 
with large populations, such as metropolitan or national audiences, or with 
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dispersed social formations which can only be identified in the first place 
as a ‘community’ through the application of an essentialism of some kind, 
at which point a ‘blunt’ ethnography is almost inevitable.
The distinction that I have sought to establish between two different 
forms of ethnographic practice, which have arguably become implicitly 
positioned here as examples of good and bad practice, is instrumental and 
can only be loosely determined. Ethnographic studies will most likely 
combine both ‘blunt’ and ‘situated’ elements within their research practice 
according to the available means and the context of the research. This 
does not mean all such media studies are essentialist and therefore com-
promised, and in any case the essentialist problem also arises when using 
other methodologies. Nonetheless, Arild Fetveit (2001) is probably right 
to point out that any assumption that human research is of necessity less 
essentialist than textual research of the human condition is dangerous, and 
most likely, indefensible. For some, the benefits of ethnographic practice 
operate along a quantitative scale, where research based on a handful of 
subjects is seen to be a less solid or ‘rigorous’ basis for conjecture than a 
study that includes thousands. However, sample size, while indubitably 
contributing depth to a study, has surprisingly little bearing on the likely 
occurrence of essentialism. This is at least partly because a preponderance 
towards essentialism is built into any signifying system. This is a problem 
which can therefore only be partially overcome through intellectual 
diligence, both by researchers and their readership. In the case of media-
centric ethnography, however, I think there is a significant additional 
danger in the transfer of ethnographic models of community from 
classical anthropological studies to a media-research environment. It is 
worth recalling Philip Schlesinger’s observation (2000: 21) that there has 
typically been an internalist focus towards the socializing agency of media 
in modern communications theory, rather than an emphasis on mediated 
exchange across social groups. If this internalist focus is coupled with the 
use of ethnographic terminology originally developed by anthropologists 
for the analysis of what were then presumed to be relatively stable and 
located cultural communities, there is likely to a bias towards conceiving 
of a media audience as a discrete, and culturally similar, population.
In order to correlate the methodological dimension of this argument 
with the theoretical basis from which we began, it is necessary to consider 
the nature of the social imagination at work in the ethnographic method. 
In the first place, ethnography is an empirical tradition that seeks to 
manufacture situated knowledge. The nature of this situated knowledge 
derives from its origin within the lived social relations from which it is 
purportedly drawn, and for which it provides evidence. The authority of 
situated knowledge in ethnographic practice is based upon the particularity 
of the quantitative and/or qualitative evidence gathered at any site of social 
practice, but the ultimate production of that knowledge nonetheless occurs 
elsewhere. While the authority of situated knowledge is located in the 
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research subject, the agency inherent in the production of such knowledge 
is epistemological. It occurs at the moment where quantitative data is 
inscribed with meaning through qualified explanation and, conversely, 
where qualitative data is assumed by extension to represent a social truth 
operating at a larger scale. The moment of epistemological agency is a 
moment of position-taking, one where the creative imagination of the 
researcher claims situated knowledge. It is, of necessity, a point at which 
articulations of various individual and collective senses of self and other 
are defined, stabilized and inter-related from a particular standpoint.
Marcel Stoetzler and Nira Yuval-Davies make the argument, generally 
accepted I think, that the production of situated knowledge can no longer 
base its authority upon the masking notions of an objective research position 
or a universal set of truths within which any particular manifestation of 
social practice or location can be encapsulated. Stoetzler and Yuval-Davies 
propose instead that the production of situated knowledge should be 
predicated in the first place upon the notion of a ‘situated imagination’. 
They indicate that the idea of a situated subject has received substantial 
discussion under the guise of standpoint theories which:
claim, in somewhat different ways, that it is vital to account for the social 
positioning of the social agent. This accounting for the situatedness of the 
knowing subject has been used epistemologically in standpoint theories in 
at least two different ways: the first claims that a specific social situatedness 
… endows the subject with a privileged access to truth; the other … rejects 
such a position and views the process of approximating truth as part of a dia-
logical relationship among subjects who are differentially situated. (Stoetzler 
and Yuval-Davis, 2002: 315)
The first set of perspectives on the significance of subjective positioning 
is one which invokes the authoritative ethnographic subject. This is the 
position which allows for only a subject occupying a particular social cat-
egory to speak for others in that category. It is predicated upon the inimical 
difference of any given subjective position as categorized by ideologies 
of class, gender, ethnicity, faith, etc., when compared to another subject 
position categorized differently under the same terms. This is the point 
where subjectivity becomes identity, and where individual characteristics 
are assumed to merge with collectives of shared categorization. A more 
‘rigorous’ approach would most likely require the matching of several 
strata of subject categorization in order to construct the authoritative 
informant as a representative embodiment of a purported subject position. 
The overall premise, however, remains the same.
By contrast, the second set of perspectives seeks instead to emphasize the 
particular situatedness of experiential understandings, and thus subjective 
agency, in each and any case. In this model, every subject possesses a dif-
ferent standpoint, constructed around their own imaginative interactions 
with various ideological and material articulations of the social imaginary. 
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The agency of subjects stems from their ability to imagine creatively the 
complex interfaces between individual experiential and collective relational 
ontologies. This ‘situated imagination’ of subjects suggests a far greater 
degree of agency for media viewers than that which might be measured by 
choices of consumption alone. It is far more individuated than the model 
of agency which allows the authoritative ethnographic research subject 
to stand for, but only for, a collective expression of similar social type. 
Nonetheless, freed of the burden of representing anything other than their 
own standpoint, subjects must of necessity still articulate their relation to 
others in order to describe their own position. On this basis, this ‘situated 
imagination’ is also a site where situated knowledge is produced and con-
tested, in a form which might be defined as anchored ‘in actual social 
practices (that are linked, but not reducible to certain social positionings)’ 
(Stoetzler and Yuval-Davies, 2002: 317).
The integrity of knowledge purported to originate in the ‘situated 
imagination’ is more difficult to ‘claim’ at the moment of writing, since 
it operates without a normative representative position and can only be 
managed imaginatively by the researcher. Here, epistemological authority 
does not rest upon an ability to provide explanation, but on an ability 
to successfully convey the relatively different explanations of others, 
which in turn the reader may compare to their own imaginative position. 
The agency arising from this form of producing knowledge is not con-
centrated in any writer, speaker or reader; it is widespread throughout 
the communicative process. This model of the research relationship also 
appears to be somewhat analogous to the model of social imagination 
which it is intended to describe, that is, a dialogic relationship constructed 
across a variety of subjective standpoints which are created imaginatively 
by socially situated agents.
The cultural field as a site of relational imagining
A critical understanding of the semantic production of situated knowledge 
underpinning ethnographic enquiries has great significance for the 
construction of any alternative relational model of the media audience – 
something which I believe is absolutely necessary for establishing clarity 
of both terminology and intent in audience research. The alternative 
that I propose here rests upon the conception of a media audience as 
inhabitants of a ‘cultural field’ centred on the media product in question. 
The community referenced here is simply formulated as a population 
constructed through their participation in the production, distribution or 
consumption of a media artefact. This artefact is further perceived of as 
having the potential to enact diverse cultural dialogues across a wide and 
variegated social space. It is not assumed that members of the audience pre-
possess a shared identity which can be measured through the product itself. 
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It does, however, assume that they have a shared interest (for example, in 
a certain source or genre of film culture), and that mapping the different 
subjective positions from which they imagine or identify those cultural 
artefacts is most useful, not for the centralizing of the object itself, but 
rather for an analysis of the position-takings and agencies at play in the 
articulation of the social experiences that surround it.
Despite the obvious similarity of the term ‘cultural field’, the notion I 
am employing here differs from Pierre Bourdieu’s seminal The Field of 
Cultural Production (1993). This is primarily a question of purpose. My 
concern is not with a systematic power structure of aesthetics or the hierar-
chies of production, but with the varied situation of cultural consumption. 
Nonetheless, it may be worth considering Bourdieu’s theory in order to 
make these distinctions more apparent. For Bourdieu, the ‘field of cultural 
production’ is an area of activity bounded by an internal logic which 
exists within a hierarchy of larger homologous fields (of power, eco-
nomics, education), but which is nonetheless relatively autonomous from 
them. The field is inhabited by active agents involved in the production 
of cultural forms, who struggle to achieve hegemony over the means of 
production, and thus the field itself. It is this struggle for control which 
creates volition within the field, and in this sense the cultural field 
reflects the ‘social relations of which these symbolic systems are a more 
or less transformed expression’ (1993: 32). Bourdieu describes the field 
of culture as an ‘economic world reversed’, where the symbolic capital 
being contested has an inverse value to its economic potential. It is in 
this way that the superiority of a ‘restricted field’, described as the ‘most 
perfectly autonomous sector of the field of cultural production, where 
the only audience aimed at is other producers’ is preserved (1993: 39). 
It is in this way that Bourdieu describes the divide between elite culture 
and popular culture.
What structures Bourdieu’s cultural field is not only the internal logic 
of an economic world reversed, but also the ‘position-takings’ of agents 
(cultural producers). In turn, their position in the field is relative to 
their contestation of the ‘legitimate’ form of cultural production as well 
as subject to the influence of their habitus. The habitus is the product of 
their education (the sum of familial, institutional and diffuse didacticism), 
and it is this which gives them the means to comprehend the code of the 
cultural product in question and the rules of the field. This ability in turn 
allows them to unconsciously translate the ‘cultural capital’ inherent to the 
field into the maintenance or improvement of their position in the field, 
or into other forms of capital (economic, political, educational). Bourdieu 
claims that habitus produces a superior understanding of forms closer to 
the ‘restricted field’ by members of the dominant classes, since cultural 
capital is distributed unevenly among social classes acculturated for different 
purposes. A suitable habitus is required to ‘enter’ the field of cultural pro-
duction, and some are more suitable than others, according to its system of 
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value. From this perspective, Bourdieu sees the role of the cultural field, 
as with the educational field, as reinforcing class differences found in the 
fields of power and economics. So despite the relative autonomy of the 
cultural field, the collective effect of their habitus upon agents generates 
practices within the field that reinforce class relations.
The ‘cultural field’ research model that I propose has goals, and as-
sumptions, which are markedly different from the prerogatives that guide 
Bourdieu’s use of the term ‘field’. First of all, I reject even a qualified 
notion that there are other fields, such as economics or power, which 
exist outside of the realm of culture. Culture, as I have described it here, 
is the sum of ‘actions and articulations’ stemming from the human im-
agination, and as such represents the totality of social life. Commerce 
and politics are both cultural activities, and they are neither outside of, 
nor autonomous in relation to, culture; nor is any observable instance of 
cultural practice autonomous in relation to their influence. In short, I am 
unconvinced by variants of the base–superstructure argument that present 
capitalism as a force external to the social imagination. However, even 
when taken on its own terms as a realm of activity distinct from other 
forms of practice, Bourdieu’s ‘field of cultural production’ represents a 
different understanding of the cultural in certain key areas. First of all is 
his insistence that the ‘restricted production’ of high cultures is inherently 
of greater symbolic worth than the ‘mass production’ of popular culture. 
Such a formulation only makes sense where the term ‘culture’ is made 
effectively synonymous with the term ‘art’, which is, in all fairness, the 
consistent object of Bourdieu’s attention. However, it is not my intention 
here to make any explicit or implicit value judgement between different 
formations of cultural practice.
There are also differences in approach, which I wish to emphasize when 
we turn from the hierarchical principles that structure Bourdieu’s field and 
focus instead on its inhabitants. The agents within Bourdieu’s field are 
all in some sense involved in the production of cultural artefacts. He 
attributes little, or no, agency to the consumers of those artefacts, which 
implies that they exist outside the field of cultural production and have no 
meaningful influence upon it. Bourdieu rejects ‘the hypothesis of the spon-
taneous correspondence or deliberate matching of production to demand 
or commissions’ (1993: 34). He is only able to do so, I would suggest, by 
first supposing that commercial activities are of necessity peripheral to the 
field and that the centre of the field is ‘perfectly autonomous’ from the 
need for an audience. This seems to contradict his enquiry into the social 
relations that constitute cultural production, or at least to limit that enquiry 
to a ‘perfect’ closed society of producers. For my purposes, I would concur 
instead with Appadurai’s (1996: 7) formulation that there is also a degree 
of agency inherent in the consumption of a cultural artefact, and I would 
suggest that these consuming agents therefore exert a powerful force upon 
the field associated with it.
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Taken together, rejecting the existence of external non-cultural fields 
and attributing agency to consumers prompts us to re-evaluate the nature 
of the ‘position-takings’ within the field. If consumers of cultural products 
may not all have a vested interest in a struggle for control of the legitimate 
method of production, then what explains their position as agents within 
the field? Are there more or less ‘perfect’ forms of consumption (where 
the symbolic struggle is for pleasure rather than prestige) to be contested 
along with those of production? Clearly, if the field is inhabited by both 
producers and consumers and also contains varied forces or relations of 
aesthetics, commerce, politics and other forms of social interaction, then 
its nature as a ‘field of struggles’ is much more complex. It may not, for 
example, possess the discernible positive and negative poles which are 
essential to Bourdieu’s formulation. Without the presumption of such a 
binary struggle, or of a ‘perfect’ centre, the inculcation of their habitus 
is left as the sole determinant of the situation of agents in relation to 
cultural production. However, since processes of education (be they 
formal or diffuse) are inherently cultural practices, the habitus implies 
a profoundly structuralist argument; that is, our position in relation to 
culture is determined by our cultural position. In this case, why should 
there ever be any movement in the field? The notion of the habitus seems 
to limit human agency to, at best, an unconscious pursuit in the cultural 
field of inculcated class interests which are inherent and self-replicating 
within that field. What place does this leave for the social imagination, 
as Appadurai (1996: 7) puts it, ‘as a staging ground for action’?
Bourdieu’s theoretical model of the field of cultural production suffers 
from its restrictive definition of culture and its elevation of a ‘perfect’ 
aesthetic world of cultural production without consumption, not to men-
tion a population of more and less cultured people. If cultural studies has 
not already discredited such a notion, then it has achieved little. What I 
would seek to preserve from Bourdieu, however, is the interrogation of the 
practices which surround a cultural product as essential to an understanding 
of it, and the presence of both agency and volition within that field of 
practices. My departure from Bourdieu must be understood in relation to 
the different contexts of our enquiry. I am seeking to propose a model for 
the analysis of a cultural artefact which takes into account the varied social 
practices and environments where that artefact is materially or symbolically 
present. Bourdieu seeks to construct a hierarchy of cultural production 
that represents and reinforces class relations. Clearly, these are endeavours 
of a different kind. However, the notion of a field, which is what brings 
these divergent concerns together in the first place, is extremely import-
ant because I believe it offers the best possibility of researching a cultural 
product not simply in and of itself, nor as a straightforward allegorical 
transposition of a society or societal group. It differs, therefore, from the 
demographic model of the media audience since ‘what can be constituted 
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as a system for the sake of analysis’ is not assumed to be ‘the product of a 
coherence-seeking intention or an objective consensus’ (Bourdieu, 1993: 
34). However, I will depart from Bourdieu’s subsequent conclusion that 
the field must therefore be ‘the product and prize of a permanent conflict’ 
(1993: 34) and suggest instead that the cultural field is a discursive space 
representing the area of influence surrounding any given artefact, idea 
or practice, and that, following Appadurai, this cultural field is defined 
by the imaginative work of its participants.
The cultural field model is thus conceived as a radial zone of influence 
within which viewers engage with a cultural artefact for different pur-
poses, and from different standpoints, generating different meanings 
and pleasures. Within this field of practices participants occupy different 
positions in relation to the object of interest, ranging from those with a 
deep degree of investment, either personally or professionally, to those 
who are disinterested or only dimly aware of the artefact, idea or prac-
tice. However, positionality within a field is not restricted to centre and 
periphery, since it is also affected by the relative influence of other over-
lapping fields imagined around other ideas and practices, against which 
participation in this field is understood by participants in relative terms. 
The inhabitants of any cultural field will therefore understand their 
participation and situation within that field relative to the intersection 
of the field with a wide range of other ideas and practices (and therefore 
other fields) that contribute to their social and cultural literacy. Thus, 
there is virtually no limit to the number of positionalities available within 
the field itself. Furthermore, for participants, the imagined relations 
between themselves, the object at the centre of the field and the fields 
formed around overlapping ideas or practices are likely to change over 
time. Therefore, the relative position of agents in a field is also subject to 
temporal change. Finally, the situation or position-taking of agents will 
also be articulated relative to the hypothetical presence of other agents 
within the field – since their own perception of other unknown members 
of the audience is critical to any variant of the ‘imagined community’ 
argument. A cultural field is therefore a dynamic site constructed from 
the sum of participants understood as a body of diverse and mobile agents 
engaged in particular and relative forms of social imagination.
It is particularly helpful to think of media audiences in this way because 
under the aegis of ‘globalization’, any community imagined through media 
use is likely to be shaped by multiple practices of cultural consumption 
and association. This is precisely because what most characterizes the 
contemporary media as a discursive force in society is its multiple sources 
and its intertextuality. It is also hoped that the notion proposed here of a 
cultural field may facilitate a more dynamic enquiry into both the media 
artefact in question and the social imagination that surrounds it than the 
arbitrary or ‘blunt’ imposition of sameness upon members of any audience 
under the guise of ‘identity’. The cultural field model, unlike demo-
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graphically constituted ethnographic enquiry, does not bear the burden 
of providing a representative sample of a collective truth. What it allows 
for is the inclusion of participants whose situated imaginations have a 
bearing upon the enquiry; the wider the enquiry, the larger the field from 
which they can be drawn. Nonetheless, in a certain sense a ‘cultural field’ 
model of analysis still represents an arbitrary closure. It recognizes that no 
artefact, idea or practice is a discrete entity, but nonetheless delimits the 
size of the field being surveyed solely in relation to the object of analysis 
which defines the field and the questions being asked of it.
Of course, in any given situation a practical methodological structure 
remains essential in order to conduct meaningful research into this complex 
melange of objects, practices and occurrences. Since it remains the case 
that no practical study is likely to exhaust the range of positionalities and 
linkages which are extant in any field of cultural practices, what we should 
seek, through qualitative audience research of this kind, is a selection of 
point samples from within a particular field whose position-takings might 
be understood in relative terms. In practice, the method of selection will 
always be conducted along a spectrum of intervention by the researcher, 
since there can be no perfectly representative subject, nor any method of 
selection which is truly ‘imperfect’. In practice, again, there is only limited 
equality of position among agents in any qualitative study. The articulate, 
informed and compliant will always be better represented in scholarly text 
than their opposites. Rethinking the terrain of qualitative media research, 
however valuable, is unlikely to be a cure-all for the practical limitations 
of any applied research work. Nonetheless, the ‘cultural field’ model as 
employed in my own modest research activities to date did, I think, reveal 
a more diverse population interacting with Indian movies in Australia 
than a ‘media-ethnography’ would perhaps have allowed. Consequently, 
that study challenged the notion that ethnic media operated within a 
multicultural society as closed ‘public sphericules’ restricted to local and 
transnational aspects of their ‘own’ ethnic community (Cunningham, 2001, 
2002). Situating the Indian film as the focal point for a field of relations 
also provided a conceptual basis for exploring not only the material, but 
also the imaginative, relations between industry players and audience 
members. This, I think, will be an important area of enquiry for media 
studies in the coming years.
In a general sense, then, the proposition of this ‘cultural field’ model, 
and its use in my recent work, has been predicated upon my own position-
taking as a researcher. Appadurai, as an anthropologist, remains primarily 
interested in the cultural lives of human communities, and his interest in 
the media and globalization is directed towards that goal. This explains his 
proposition ‘that we regard as cultural only those differences that either 
express, or set the groundwork for, the mobilization of group identities’ 
and that therefore ‘we restrict the term culture as a marked term to 
the subset of these differences that has been mobilized to articulate the 
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boundary of difference’ (1996: 13). Bourdieu, on the other hand, as a socio-
logist, sought a systematic understanding of cultural practice as part of 
a larger social system. In both these instances, cultural practice has been 
employed as a means of assessing social groups. However, what I have 
sought to achieve as a media researcher is, in some senses, the inverse of 
these enquiries: to interrogate the nature of the social imagination formed 
around engagement with a media artefact under contemporary conditions. 
Put simply, what I am proposing here are not new ways of using the 
media to do sociology, but rather a renewed critical engagement with 
the sociology of media. This represents an important shift in emphasis, 
making it necessary to articulate the applicability of the notions of ‘field’ 
and ‘imaginative relations’ in this particular context. By my own reading, 
the cultural field model has the potential to facilitate innovative audience 
research and to meet the considerable challenge of remaining situated 
in lived social relations, without relying on the determining stability of 
identarian logics for its authority. Accordingly, I am left feeling that the 
notion of a ‘cultural field’, or something like it, may open up exciting 
possibilities for future media research.
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